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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
property has been transferred into the hands of a good faith
third party purchaser who has relied on the public records.
Helen M. Wimmer
SECURITY DEVICES-PERSONAL LIABILITY OF THIRD PARTY
PURCHASERS UNDER REVISED STATUTES 9:5362
The Harris Finance Company brought action against Fridge
to recover the balance of the purchase price of an automobile
which was secured by a chattel mortgage. Fridge purchased the
car from the mortgagor and was being sued under the provisions
of Title 9, Section 5362, of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. This
statute states: "It shall be unlawful for a resident of any parish
to purchase the movable property described in R.S. 9:5351 from
any non-resident of such parish, without first obtaining an affi-
davit from the non-resident that there is no mortgage on the
property, nor any money due on the purchase price thereof, and
the purchaser who shall buy the movable property without
having obtained the affidavit, shall be personally liable to the
creditor for the debt secured by the property." Defendant Fridge
failed to get the affidavit required by the statute. Harris Finance
Company had failed to record the mortgage. Because of this fact
Fridge was a purchaser without notice, and the question was
whether the provisions of the statute applied to him. Held, Fridge
was personally liable to the Harris Finance Company on the
basis of the statute. Harris Finance Company v. Fridge, 55 So.
2d 707 (La. 1951).
The particular section in question was originally enacted as
Section 5 of Act 151 of 1916. It was included as Section 5 of Act
198 of 1918 and Section 8 of Act 172 of 1944. It was then written
verbatim into the Revised Statutes of 1950. The court of appeal
said in Finance Security Company v. Williams' that although
the mortgage in that case could not affect third persons because
it was invalid, "the liability herein sought to be imposed on them
does not arise out of the act of mortgage itself. Their liability,
if any, is purely statutory and came into existence by virtue of
the provisions of Section 8 of Act 172 of 1944." 2 In the Harris
1. 42 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 1949), rehearing refused 42 So. 2d 901 (La. App.
1949).
2. 42 So. 2d 310, 313.
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case the supreme court held that the liability of a third party
under Revised Statutes 9:5362 came into existence even though
the holder of the chattel mortgage had not recorded the mort-
gage.3 The court agreed with the Williams case, stating "we
prefer to rest our decision squarely on the ground that the
defendant, having failed to secure the necessary affidavit, became
personally liable for the debt irrespective of whether the mort-
gage was filed for recordation or not. . . . If the legislature had
intended that this provision of the Act should only apply when
a mortgage was timely filed for recordation, it would have so
stated." 4
Four possible fact situations might arise under the statute.
The first is that involved in'the Harris case where there was no
recordation of the mortgage and the third party did not obtain an
affidavit that there was no mortgage on the property. As seen,
the court held in favor of the holder of the mortgage because
Revised Statutes 9:5362 imposes personal liability on the third
party in this situation. A second situation is one where the third
party secures the affidavit although the mortgage is unrecorded.
In this situation the chattel mortgage would be ineffective since,
due to lack of recordation, the third party would be without
notice. Nor would there be any personal liability since he
obtained the affidavit in compliance with 9:5362.
The third situation would arise where the holder of the mort-
gage had it properly recorded and where the third party did not
secure the required affidavit. In this case the third party not
only would take the movable subject to the mortgage, but he
would be liable for the entire debt owed on it, because of the
personal liability imposed by the statute in the absence of an
3. In a case under the 1918 act the court of appeal held that the mort-
gage must be recorded for the act to give a right of action. Booth Motor Co.
v. Gamburg, 9 La. App. 60, 118 So. 854 (1928).
In another court of appeal case, Cullen Thompson Motor Co. v. Sullivan
and Phillips, 12 La. App. 486, 126 So. 456 (1930), the court held that Act 198 of
1918 did not apply to foreign mortgages. The opinion said, "It is apparent ...
that the Act was intended to apply only to mortgages . . . embraced in the
Act [i.e., mortgages executed in Louisiana] ... the mortgage [in this case a
foreign mortgage] . . . is, therefore, not covered by that provision which
imposed liability . . . without first requiring an affidavit."
Other cases under the 1918 act are Southland Securities Co. v. Thieme,
142 So. 375 (La. App. 1932), where the court held that the fact that the
mortgagor was a nonresident of the parish was sufficient and a contrary
belief on the part of the third party did not excuse him for not getting the
affidavit; Gulf Finance Securities Co. v. Taylor, 2 La. App. 473 (1925), where
the court held that the purchase by a third party made at a judicial sale in
good faith gave the third party a good title.
4. 55 So. 2d 707, 709 (La. 1951).
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affidavit. The last situation is that where the mortgage is
recorded and the third party secures the affidavit. In this case
also the third party would take the movable subject to the mort-
gage because the mortgage was recorded. However, he would
incur no personal liability since he obtained the affidavit.
The purpose of this legislation was to provide for the mort-
gaging of movable property and to protect the rights of the
mortgagee. One of the means for achieving the latter purpose
is the requirement of an affidavit and the imposition of personal
liability on those who fail to obtain it. It is questionable whether
this is necessary to achieve the purpose of the statute and whether
the statute is not too harsh in imposing personal liability on a
third party.
First, are the means used by the statute necessary to achieve-
ment of its purpose? There are two parties who can be defrauded,
the mortgagee and the third party. Whether the mortgagee has
recorded the mortgage or not, the statute does not seem to pre-
vent effectively the fraudulent disposition of the property to his
detriment. The lack of recordation of the mortgage makes the
fraudulent disposition of the property depend solely upon whether
the. mortgagor wants to sell without mentioning the unrecorded
mortgage to the third party. He can give the third party a nega-
tive affidavit, and certainly the third party cannot be blamed
if he takes the property. Also the third party is not protected
since there is no way for him conveniently to check the validity
of the affidavit; besides, he is without notice and the mortgage is
not effective against the property in his hands. When the mort-
gage is recorded, the affidavit still does not prevent fraud. The
mortgagor can transfer the property to the third party in any
event. In this case the mortgagee does not need the protection
of the affidavit. He can pursue the property under the mortgage
since the third party, has notice. Neither does the third party
need the affidavit to protect himself, since he can do this by
checking the records. It would therefore appear that where. the
only wrongdoer is the mortgagor, the statute does not deter him
by punishing the third party with imposition of personal liability.
Second, even if the affidavit does seem justified or necessary
to achieve the purpose of the statute, is the penalty on the third
party too harsh? If the mortgage is recorded it is easy enough
for the mortgagee to follow the property. He can then go against
the mortgagor for any balance due him. This gives him the same
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protection, in effect, as if the mortgagor never sold the property
to the third party. If the mortgage is unrecorded, the rights of
the mortgagee against the mortgagor are still the same as if the
mortgage was recorded, but the mortgagee has no right of seizure
against the third party; the third party is liable, however, if he
has no affidavit. This personal liability can, in some cases, im-
pose a very harsh penalty on the third party. For example, if
the property involved were an automobile that had been wrecked
since the original purchase, the third party might be held for
possibly a $2000 debt because he purchased a car for $900 with-
out getting the affidavit.
Under the present law the Harris case was certainly cor-
rectly decided. It would seem, however, that the statute which
is. the basis for the decision does not achieve its purpose by
imposing personal liability on third parties who fail to obtain the
affidavit. Also the penalty for this failure seems to be harsher
than it need be. This purpose of the statute might be achieved
as effectively by having a statute which would merely make




Defendant sold bottled gas in a defective container and an
explosion resulting from this defective condition injured the
plaintiff's unborn child, which was in the eighth month of gesta-
tion. The child was born dead and action was brought under
Nebraska's wrongful death statute.' That act provides that where
the decedent could have maintained an action for injuries had
death not ensued, the wrongful death action permits recovery by
the appropriate members of the family or next of kin.2 The
Supreme Court of Nebraska denied recovery, adhering to the
majority common law rule that for actions in tort for personal
injuries, an unborn child is not recognized as a separate being.
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Company, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (Neb. 1951).
1. Neb. Rev. Stat. 30:809 (1943).
2. The act is based on the English wrongful death statute, Lord Camp-
bell's Act. Practically every state has adopted similar acts and it follows
that there is no reason to segregate physical injury actions from wrongful
death actions in treating the problem.
1952] NOTES
